Are UN peacekeepers effective in protecting civilians from violence? Existing studies examine this issue at the country level, thereby making it difficult to isolate the effect of peacekeepers and to assess the actual mechanism at work. This article provides the first comprehensive evaluation of UN peacekeeping success in protecting civilians at the subnational level. We argue that peacekeepers through their sizable local presence can increase the political and military costs for warring actors to engage in civilian targeting. Since peacekeepers' access to civilian populations rests on government consent, peacekeepers will primarily be effective in imposing these costs on rebel groups, but less so for government actors. To test these conjectures we combine new monthly data on the location of peacekeepers with data on the location and timing of civilian killings in Africa. Our findings suggest that local peacekeeping presence enhances the effectiveness of civilian protection against rebel abuse, but that UN peacekeeping struggles to protect civilians from government forces.
Introduction
The nature of UN peacekeeping has undergone a dramatic shift in recent decades. Many missions are now deployed to ongoing conflicts with robust mandates to protect civilians, reflecting a strong overall trend within UN peacekeeping towards making civilian protection their key imperative.
2 These operations, however, face tremendous challenges in fulfilling their mandates, and there are large sub-national variations in where peacekeepers are deployed and how successful they are in addressing violence on the ground. Indeed, many missions struggle to cover all areas where civilians are at risk. Even with a sizeable peacekeeping force, large areas with grave security concerns often remain outside the reach of international forces. UNAMID in Darfur, for example, has been criticized for its limited presence beyond headquarters and inability to patrol the vast region, challenging the mission's ability to shield civilians from attacks. 3 Most mission mandates also include caveats specifying that peacekeepers should protect civilians "within capabilities and areas of deployment". 4 To advance our understanding of the impact of peacekeeping on violence against civilians it is therefore necessary to go beyond the country level and examine the question with sub-national data where the dynamics of violence unfold.
We argue that a sizeable local presence is critical for the ability of peacekeepers to protect civilians from armed actors. Peacekeepers on the ground can monitor and report ongoing violations, which could heighten the political costs of targeting civilians through international condemnations and even arrests. Local presence also raises the military costs of targeting civilians because it represents a credible threat of military counteraction. Yet, 2 Bellamy 2009; Holt and Taylor 2009. 3 See for example Human Rights Watch 2014. 4 Holt and Taylor 2009, 40. whereas local deployment is critical for the ability of peacekeepers to shape the local incentive structure for civilian victimization, effective protection also hinges upon getting access to civilian populations. Because the peacekeepers depend on government consent for such access, we argue that peacekeepers will be better positioned to credibly impose costs on rebel groups compared to governments.
Testing these conjectures, we provide the first systematic cross-national study of the local effectiveness of UN peacekeeping in protecting civilians. Existing research suggests that peacekeeping operations reduce violence against civilians when they are sizeable 5 and diverse in their composition. 6 However, these studies examine peacekeeping at the country level, thereby aggregating across sub-national locations with large variation in where peacekeepers are deployed and one-sided violence occurs. To improve our ability to isolate the effect of peacekeepers and pass a clearer verdict on the actual mechanism through which peacekeeping works, we introduce new geographically and temporally disaggregated data on the strength of local peacekeeping deployment across all UN missions to Africa with a civilian protection mandate between 2000 and 2011. We combine this with geo-referenced event data on violence against civilians at the monthly level. 7 Our results show that UN peacekeepers do deploy to areas that have experienced civilian atrocities; but we find no discernable effect of peacekeeping troops on the risk of one-sided violence generally. However, when making a distinction between violence by rebel and government actors, our results show that the more peacekeeping forces deployed to a location, the less likely that rebel groups will carry out attacks in these areas. We do not find the same encouraging results for the government side: local peacekeeping 5 Hultman , Kathman, and Shannon 2013; Kathman and Wood 2016 . 6 Bove and Ruggeri 2016.
7 Sundberg and Melander 2013. deployment does not decrease the risk of abuse by government actors. To account for the fact that peacekeepers are not deployed at random, we take several steps to ensure robust inference, including matching-techniques and the estimation of a recursive bivariate probit model. One concern with identifying a local effect is that peacekeeping presence merely displaces violence to increase the vulnerability of civilians at risk in the surrounding areas.
Importantly, we find no evidence for such dynamics.
Our statistical results thus add important nuance to the existing literature by suggesting a more complex relationship between peacekeepers and civilian protection. The finding that local protection mainly works through peacekeepers' ability to impose costs on rebel groups diverges from country-level results that peacekeepers also reduce government-perpetrated atrocities. One interpretation is that the ability of the UN to curb government violence primarily works through political pressure in the national arena and strategic deterrence, rather than through local level mechanisms of monitoring and tactical deterrence. The interaction between peacekeepers and rebel groups seems instead to be more localized, with rebels being more sensitive to the local threat of military costs and less able than government forces to shape the patterns of local peacekeeping deployment.
These findings imply that peacekeeping missions need to develop different strategies for tackling violence against civilians by governments and rebel groups respectively. The UN should strive for a flexible approach to redeployment within countries, base deployment decisions on careful analyses of the threat to the civilian population by rebel actors, and devise policies for better dealing with governments that resist deployments to certain areas.
Previous Research
Many studies agree that UN peacekeeping generally is good at achieving what it was initially designed to do -keep the peace between warring actors in the aftermath of armed conflict. The impact of peacekeeping may not be the same for government and rebel behavior.
Peacekeeping protection hinges critically on access to civilian populations, yet their ability to reach all areas of the country will depend on the government. Since consent is one of the key principles of peacekeeping, host governments de facto have the power to veto UN access to particular areas. As recognized in the UN principles of peacekeeping, consent to a mission by the warring parties "…does not necessarily imply or guarantee that there will also be consent at the local level". 33 Peacekeeping missions are at times faced with an unwilling or even hostile host government that restricts the freedom of movement of peacekeepers, 34 which in turn also constrains the peacekeepers' ability to protect civilians where they are at risk.
It is increasingly recognized that peacekeepers face obstacles to their ability to move around freely and deploy to the areas where violence occurs. The peacekeeping mission in DRC has at times found itself in the troublesome position of having to collaborate with government forces even though they were known to abuse the civilian population.
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While the question of consent may cause problems also in the interaction with rebel groups, their consent may not be as critical. 39 Non-state actors cannot in the same way resist deployments of peacekeepers and are thus likely to be sensitive to both the political and the military costs of targeting civilians, as peacekeepers are able to move into rebel-held areas. While rebel actors could seek to thwart deployments by challenging the peacekeepers militarily, they would then have to face the military costs of such a confrontation. In sum, while peacekeepers generally should be able to impose military and political costs on state actors, peacekeeping is likely to be a weaker tool against government forces than rebel groups. In order to evaluate this empirically, we specify separate hypotheses for rebel and government actors respectively.
H2a: The more peacekeeping forces deployed to a location, the lower the likelihood of violence against
civilians by rebel groups.
H2b: More peacekeeping forces deployed to a location will not influence the likelihood of violence against civilians by governments.

Research Design
To examine the effects of peacekeeping at the local level we employ a disaggregated research design that allows us to capture fine-grained variations in the sub-national patterns 38 Holt and Taylor 2009. and Sudan (UNMIS, UNAMID, UNISFA). For our statistical analysis, we include the country from the month the mission was established, or the month the mission received a protection mandate from the Security Council, and follow the missions until the end of 2011, or until the mission ends (see Table A1 in Appendix).
To construct our units of analysis we rely on a spatial grid structure that divides the above countries into cells that are 0.5×0.5 degrees (approximately 55x55 km at the Equator). 41 This spatial resolution allows us to analyze the effect of peacekeeping presence on the behavior of the warring parties in their areas of deployment. In contrast to, for example, conflict zones, the grid structure provides a unit of observation that is not itself endogenous to conflict processes. Meanwhile, aggregation beyond the single event reduces the influence of measurement error in the dependent variable. Armed actors are likely to respond swiftly to shifts in their tactical environment and we expect deployment of peacekeepers to have immediate effects on the likelihood of civilian victimization. To 40 With this geographical scope, we only exclude two protection missions in the same period: MINUSTAH in Haiti and UNIFIL in Lebanon. In both these countries the armed conflict, including systematic violence against civilians, ended the same year as the peacekeeping missions received a protection mandate. 41 The spatial grid structure and several of our control variables are taken from PRIO-GRID version 2.0. Tollefsen, Strand, and Buhaug 2012. recognize the temporal dynamics of both troop deployment and levels of violence, we use monthly observations of the grid cells as our units of analysis. 42 We include all grid cells in the countries with a UN mission, thereby observing all locations at risk of violence against civilians and with a chance of receiving peacekeepers. With this specification, the dataset includes a total of 217,823 observations.
Dependent variables
Our dependent variables capture whether direct and deliberate attacks on civilians occur in a grid cell in a given month, using data from the UCDP Geo-referenced Event Dataset v.5.0. 43 In UCDP GED all cases where one-sided violence by an armed actor reaches an annual 25 fatality threshold are recorded as separate events and provided with a geographical reference in the form of a latitude/longitude coordinate and a date. 44 This allows us to examine the local covariates of violence against civilians. The expectation that peacekeepers should be able to eliminate every single incident of one-sided violence is in our view too restrictive. At the same time, we want to put the theory to a hard test and operationalize protection of civilians as reducing violence to very low levels. Therefore, our dependent variables are coded as dichotomous variables, marking those cases where five or more civilians were killed in a given grid cell in a given month. 45 We construct three 42 In our sample, we have 10,407 monthly observations with peacekeepers deployed in the cell; of those 3,564 are months where the number of peacekeepers changed from the month before.
43 Sundberg and Melander 2013. 44 For more information on the geo-referenced event data see the UCDP GED codebook. for our eleven missions are collected from a total of 192 maps. The UN maps do not directly report the number of troops, but they do provide information about the number of battalions, companies, and platoons at each location. Based on information about the standard size of these units, we have generated estimates of the number of troops. of deployed troops (for the non-zero observations) in our data is 10 and the maximum is 5500. The average number in locations with deployment is 522 and the standard deviation is 664. In the statistical analyses, the variable is rescaled so that one unit corresponds to 100 troops.
[ Figure 1 about here]
Control Variables
We control for a range of potentially confounding variables. Neigh. Cells, which is a count of the total number of peacekeeping troops in the first-order neighboring grid. In the robustness section we introduce a number of additional control variables, for example, related to PKO country-level characteristics, alongside alternative operationalizations of our independent and dependent variables. Summary statistics for our variables are presented in Table 1 .
[ Table 1 about here]
Non-random deployment of peacekeepers
The deployment of peacekeepers is not a random process and potential selection effects may confound an analysis of peacekeeping effectiveness. Several country-level studies suggest that peacekeepers tend to be sent to cases with higher conflict intensity or more civilian casualties, 51 and a recent sub-national analysis suggests that such patterns are also urban center with more than 50,000 inhabitants. Population and distance to city are log-transformed. The variables are from PRIO-GRID version 2.0. Tollefsen, Strand, and Buhaug 2012; Tollefsen et al. 2015. 50 Based on data from the UCDP GED. Melander 2013. 51 Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Melander 2009; Hultman 2013. manifest at the local level. 52 Since peacekeepers are deployed in the hardest cases, we are thus likely to underestimate any effect of peacekeeping on violence against civilians.
Having said this, understanding and accounting for this selection effect is important for analyzing the impact of peacekeeping on civilian targeting. In our robustness section we elaborate on three steps we have taken to ensure more robust inference regarding the causal impact of peacekeeping on local protection. First, we examine whether our results hold when accounting for longer-term trends in our dependent variable to make sure that there is no strategic selection of peacekeepers into areas where violence is already on the decline. Second, we use matching techniques to create a more balanced dataset to ensure that our results are not due to systematic differences between the areas that see peacekeeping deployment and those that do not (in particular differences that may be correlated with lower levels of violence against civilians). Third, we estimate a two-stage simultaneous equation model with an instrumental variable, that account for correlation in the error terms in the process of peacekeeping deployment and the process of civilian victimization.
All three approaches are designed to account for the broader issue of non-random deployment of peacekeepers in a statistical framework where we are primarily concerned with the effect that peacekeepers have on local protection. In addition, we also explore the question of peacekeeping deployment in a more direct manner. We examine whether peacekeepers are deployed to the areas with the highest risk of civilian targeting, or if peacekeepers tend to shy away from these areas. First, we look at how violence influences the likelihood that peacekeepers are first deployed to an area. If there is violence against civilians in the cell or in the first-order neighboring cells, we see the onset of local peacekeeping within one month in 48 instances; within three months there are 99 new deployments; and within six months there are a total of 157 new deployments. Hence, whereas the reaction is not instantaneous, the UN does seem to deploy to areas where violence occurs. At the same time, in our data there are 157 locations that experience violence against civilians at some point and where peacekeepers are never deployed. These patterns verify the picture presented by many mission reports. For example, MONUC in DRC reported that the needs were larger than their capacity, forcing the mission to focus on certain strategic areas of operation, selecting hard cases, but leaving other areas unmonitored.
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Next, we examine deployment patterns more systematically, by estimating logit models with the onset of local peacekeeping deployment as our dependent variable and OSV 3 months as our independent variable, which summarizes one-sided violence for the preceding three months. 54 We also explore if the peacekeeping deployments are driven by civil war battle deaths. In our models, we control for a range of potential confounding variables that may be associated both with deployment and civilian targeting.
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[ Table 2 about here]
In the coefficient for one-sided violence by rebel actors is positive and significant at the 95% level, the coefficient for one-sided violence by government actors is not precisely estimated.
The evidence for a relationship between battle intensity and peacekeeping deployment is generally weaker; the battle-intensity variable is not statistically significant in any of the models. Our analysis thus indicates that violence against civilians increases the likelihood of peacekeeping deployment -particularly where non-state actors target civilians -so that peacekeepers are indeed faced with hard cases of civilian protection. A look at summary statistics for our control variables, where we compare cases with and without peacekeeping deployment, is also in line this picture (see Appendix Table A2a ). If anything, this should bias against finding a strong protection effect of local peacekeeping deployment on civilian targeting in our subsequent analysis of peacekeeping effectiveness.
The Local Effects of Peacekeeping
With more knowledge of local deployment patterns, we now turn to the empirical assessment of our hypotheses on the effect of peacekeeping on civilian protection. Before presenting general patterns, we visually examine the correlation between peacekeeping size and the level of violence against civilians in six locations in the Democratic Republic of 56 We have also added variables that summarize the intensity of one-sided violence and battle violence in the cell in the 6-month period prior to peacekeeping deployment to the country. Here we find that local deployment is driven both by higher prevalence of one-sided violence, as well more intense battle violence (see Appendix Table A2b ). In five out of six locations, the graphs suggest that violence declines following an increase in peacekeepers. Hence, for the cases where peacekeepers have been deployed with large forces, we seem to discern a trend with fewer civilian casualties coinciding with the increase in local peacekeeping. These graphs also show that high spikes in violence against civilians usually are followed by an increase in peacekeeping presence, although not instantaneous.
Congo (DRC
However, in order to test whether these trends reflect a more general relationship, we turn to statistical analysis.
[Figures 2a-f about here]
In Table 3 we report the results from our analyses of the relationship between the number of peacekeeping troops in a cell and the occurrence of violence against civilians. Model 3
shows the result from a logit model with OSV as the dependent variable, controlling for a range of potential local confounders, with robust standard errors clustered at the cell level.
The coefficient for peacekeeping troops (#Troops in Cell) is negative, but not statistically significant. Hence, there is no discernable effect of peacekeeping troops on the risk of onesided violence.
Next, we evaluate our hypotheses that make a distinction between violence carried out by rebel and government actors. The results reported in Model 4 suggest that 57 Figures 2-4 were generated using the graphic schemes plotting and plotplain. Bischof 2017. peacekeepers are effective in curbing civilian targeting by rebels: when regressed on OSV Reb the coefficient for the size of peacekeeping deployment is negative and statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. Based on this model, we estimate substantive effects for an average scenario for a location with one-sided violence in the recent but not immediate past, with violence ongoing in the neighborhood, but without peacekeepers nearby. 58 Figure 3 shows how the monthly predicted probability of one-sided violence by rebels is affected by the number of PKO troops. While the overall risk of violence is small in any monthly observation of such small units, the relative decrease is noticeable: the likelihood of violence is reduced by half when going from 0 to 3000 troops. We also estimate the impact in a high-risk scenario, for a location with a substantially higher baseline risk of one-sided violence: when moving from 0 to 1500 troops in such a scenario, the monthly risk of rebel targeting civilians decreases from 29 to 22 percent, and with 3000 troops the risk is down to 17 percent. 59 This supports our argument that a stronger peacekeeping presence at the local level reduces the risk of rebel perpetrated civilian victimization also in substantial terms.
[ Table 3 about here]
[ Figure 3 about here] 58 The spatial lag is set to 1, number of troops in neighboring cells to 0, temporal decay function for OSV indicates violence at t-3, and all remaining control variables at their mean value. Probabilities are estimated using the Spost commands. Long and Freese 2014. 59 In the high-risk scenario, we specify a case with one-sided violence in the near past, as well as in the surrounding areas (spatial lag set to 1), 50 battle deaths in the same area, a mountainous area close to a large city, population at the mean, and with 3000 peacekeepers in adjacent cells (since high-risk areas are likely to have peacekeepers in the vicinity).
When we look at government violence (OSV Gov) in Model 5, the coefficient is negative, but not statistically significant. This suggests peacekeeping troops exercise a more heterogeneous effect on government, compared to rebel behavior. The results thus support our argument that peacekeeping is effective in reducing the risk of civilian victimization at the hands of rebel actors, but less so when it comes to protection from government abuse. This finding is particularly interesting in light of recent country-level evidence suggesting that increasing the number of peacekeepers reduces violence against civilians by state and non-state actors alike. 60 One interpretation of these diverging findings is that at the local level, the government's ability to veto peacekeeping deployment makes them less sensitive to the costs imposed by peacekeepers locally. At the national level, the presence of a UN mission can still put sufficient pressure on the government to precipitate a change of government strategy that leads to an overall decline in patterns of violence.
Since the imposition of military costs should be a less prevalent mechanism for civilian protection at national level, this suggests that governments are particularly sensitive to political costs associated with targeting civilians in the presence of peacekeepers. With regard to the rebel side, a sizeable local deployment has a clearly discernable effect on reducing the risk of civilian targeting. As noted in the theory section, we believe that rebel groups are particularly sensitive to the military costs that may be associated with targeting civilians in the local presence of peacekeepers. Peacekeeping may thus work through different mechanisms in shaping government and rebel behavior towards the civilian population. Governments respond to political costs at the country level, whereas rebels respond to military costs at the local level.
60 Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013. Before discussing the robustness of our results, we briefly comment on the results for the control variables. First, we find evidence that civilian targeting is correlated across space and time. Both the spatial lag and the decay functions of time since past one-sided violence are positive and significant across most models (although government violence does not seem to spur rebel violence). Battle deaths, however, do not seem to be a strong predictor of when or where civilian targeting occurs. We find that mountainous terrain increases the risk of one-sided violence, particularly for non-state actors, and that risk is greater closer to major urban centers. The spatial lag of peacekeepers is consistently negative, but in line with our overall results only significant (at the 90% level or better) for OSV Reb. Troops in the neighboring cells hence also seem to have a dampening effect on civilian victimization, which is what we should expect from peacekeepers patrolling.
However, the coefficient is smaller than for troops in the cell, indicating that local troops have a greater impact on rebel abuse than troops in the surrounding area.
Is the negative association between peacekeepers and civilian fatalities a result of peacekeepers avoiding areas that see a high risk of civilian victimization? Our analysis of peacekeeping deployment rather suggests that a prioritization works in the opposite direction: peacekeepers are deployed to areas with a high baseline risk of one-sided
violence. Yet, non-random deployment patterns imply that any correlation between peacekeepers and a reduction in one-sided violence may relate to underlying differences between the locations that see deployment and those that do not, rather than to the effectiveness of peacekeeping per se. We take three steps to ensure more robust inference regarding the effect on peacekeeping deployment: i) controlling for long-term time-trends in our dependent variable to account for an endogenous process of peacekeeping selection into peaceful locations; ii) matching methods to account for peacekeeping selection related to observable variables, and iii) estimating a bivariate probit model with an instrumental variable.
To begin with, it is conceivable that peacekeepers are deployed to secure stability in areas where the rate of violence is already trending towards peace, which by extension would lead to a spurious correlation between peacekeepers and lower levels of civilian abuse. To account for this possibility, we include control variables capturing long-term time trends in our dependent variable. The variables OSV Reb Change, and OSV Gov Change compare the average level of violence in the previous 4-month period, to the preceding 4-month period. The variables are constructed as moving averages and separate between rebel and government violence. As shown in Table 3 , Model 6 and 7 our findings remain the same.
Second, we implement Propensity Score Matching to account for the non-random deployment of peacekeepers. 61 Matching is helpful to reduce imbalances in our observed data that arise if the locations that see peacekeeping deployment are very different from those that do not, and thereby provides a more robust inference regarding the effect of our treatment across more comparable units. 62 The most important covariates to include in the matching are those that may be related to our treatment variable (peacekeeping deployment), whereas we avoid covariates that may be affected by treatment assignment to reduce the risk of post-treatment bias when estimating the effect. Based on these considerations we match on the cell-specific Pre-deployment OSV, which records the intensity (in fatalities) of violence against civilians in the cell in the 6 months prior to the deployment of the protection mission (coded 0 if there is no such violence). Similarly, the variable Pre-deployment Battle Deaths records the intensity of civil war violence occurring in the cell in the 6 months prior to the deployment of the protection mission (coded 0 if there is no such violence). We also match on Population, Mountainous Terrain and Distance to City.
61 Leuven and Sianesi 2003. 62 See for example Gilligan and Sergenti 2008. As already discussed, we believe these covariates may significantly shape the process of peacekeeping deployment, while also being related to the risk of violence against civilians.
Finally, we match on country dummies, as a way to account for some of the unobserved heterogeneity across the missions themselves and the contexts in which they intervene. We obtain our sample using one-to-one nearest neighbor matching with replacement.
After this pre-processing of the data, we are left with 20,446 observations and a substantially more balanced dataset: the mean bias drops from 44.4 in the un-matched sample to 6.3 in the matched sample. Figure 4 shows the standardized percent bias reduction for each variable. The bias is significantly reduced for important variables:
differences in pre-deployment violence, distance to city, terrain, and population size.
However, the matching sample also comes at some cost. While we retain the vast majority The results from our matched dataset should thus be seen as one of several efforts to examine the relationship between peacekeepers and civilian victimization.
[ Figure 4 about here]
In Table 4 , Model 8 we regress OSV Reb on #Troops in Cell, and include the same controls used in our main model to adjust for any remaining imbalance in these covariates within the matched sample. The coefficient for #Troops in Cell is negative and significant at the 95% confidence level; it is also larger compared to Table 3 , suggesting the effect may even have been underestimated in the non-matched sample. This lends further evidence to support the claim that the effect of peacekeeping troops cannot simply be attributed to a non-random deployment of peacekeepers to areas that see a lower risk of civilian targeting to begin with. Table 4 , Model 9 reports the effect on government violence (OSV Gov). The coefficient is negative but not statistically significant, which suggests that peacekeeping troops are not effective in protecting civilians from government violence.
[ Table 4 about here]
Whereas matching enhances confidence in our results, it can only account for selection related to observable covariates. Yet, peacekeeping deployment and lower levels of violence against civilians may also be correlated due to processes that are difficult to capture with quantitative data, for example local ceasefire agreements guaranteeing temporary civilian safe-havens under PKO protection. As a way to account for correlation in the error terms between the process of peacekeeping deployment and the process of civilian victimization, we estimate recursive bivariate probit models with two simultaneous equations. 63 Since the bivariate probit model does not allow for continuous variables, we dichotomize our peacekeeping variable and use PK Presence as the outcome in our first equation. The outcome in the second equation is our dichotomous indicator of one-sided violence (looking at rebels and government actors in two separate models). Following
Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis (2017) we include an instrument in the first stage. 64 To identify a source of variation in the probability of local deployment that is exogenous to the risk of violence against civilians in the grid cell any given month, they propose an interaction term between the total number of peacekeepers in Africa (Africa UN PKO) and distance to capital (Distance to Capital). The results are reported in Table 5 , Model 10 and 11. As expected, the instrument has a positive and significant effect on peacekeeping 63 See Maddala 1983. 64 For a similar approach see, for example, Wucherpfennig, Hunziker, and Cederman 2016. presence. Furthermore, the rho is significant in both models, confirming the appropriateness of estimating this as a two-stage process. The findings show that, even when accounting for the non-random selection of peacekeepers to a location, their presence has a negative and significant effect on reducing the risk of violence against civilians by rebel actors. In line with previous result we find no significant effect for government actors.
[ Table 5 about here]
Note that in contrast to other models, the significant coefficient in our recursive bivariate probit model relates to a dichotomous indicator of peacekeeping presence, rather than troop size. Hence, whereas our results generally indicate that a larger presence of local peacekeeping forces is associated with a lower risk of civilian targeting by rebel actors, this result suggest that even when we disregard the size of the local presence we can observe a significant effect on local protection. We have made an effort to discern whether there are threshold effects in the number of troops required for effective protection. Doing so we return to our more naïve models, which do not account for the non-random deployment of peacekeepers. In these models, a mere presence indicator does not have any significant effect (not reported here). Instead, when iteratively recoding the size of local troop deployment variable with various cutoff points, it is only at the level 400 troops where local deployment renders a statistically significant effect on the risk of one-sided violence by rebel actors (see Appendix, Table A5 ). Our control for mere presence in this specification is positive and significant. Taken together, this suggests that selection into the most violence prone places possibly confound the impact of peacekeepers where troop size is small, which bias against finding significant effects at lower thresholds.
The main results and the robustness tests present compelling evidence that a local peacekeeping force helps deter armed actors, particularly on the rebel side, from engaging in violence against civilians. Yet, by focusing on what happens in the cell we may disregard displacement effects: when peacekeepers arrive, armed actors may relocate for strategic reasons and attack civilians elsewhere. Generally, the results from Table 3 do not support such contentions since the coefficient for #Troops in Neigh. Cell is negative (and significant for rebel violence). Displacement effects may, however, manifest themselves across longer distances. As robustness, we therefore include an alternative operationalization taking the inverted distance in kilometers to the most proximate peacekeeping deployment in the country in a given month. 65 The results, reported in Appendix, Table A6 , Model 1, do not suggest displacement effects: whereas the result for troop presence in cell remains significant, the coefficient for Inverse Distance Troops is not. We explore the potential for displacement more directly in two ways. First, we estimate the effect of troops in neighboring cells on the risk of violence against civilians only for locations where no peacekeepers are present at the location. We find no evidence that nearby troops increase the risk of violence (see Appendix, Table A6 , Model 2). Second, we estimate the effect of troops at a location (at t-1 and t-2) on the risk of violence against civilians in neighboring cells. Again, we find no evidence that peacekeeping deployment increases the risk of onesided violence in the vicinity (see Appendix, Table A6 , Models 3 and 4).
Robustness
We proceed to discuss a number of additional robustness checks of our main findings, which we report in the Appendix. 66 First, we re-estimate our main result in Model 4, As reported in Appendix, Table A7 , Model 1, the coefficient for #Troops in Cell remains negative and statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. The fixed-effects model examines the determinants of within-panel variability in civilian targeting, conditional on the panel ever experiencing such violence. The negative and significant estimate thus brings confidence that our results is not simply caused by cross-cell variation, but that the deployment of peacekeepers leads to a reduction in the probability of civilian targeting in their area of operation. We have also ensured that our results are robust to accounting for time trends in our data. We are particularly concerned with how the UN has interpreted and implemented the protection mandate in peacekeeping operations over time. Our results are robust to including a measure of the time since the UN civilian protection mandate was first introduced in 1999 (see Appendix, Table A7 , Model 3).
In Appendix Table A8 , Model 1, we rerun our main models from ; and the Duration of PKO Mission. When accounting for local presence, we find no significant effect of the size of the government violence are not statistically significant with any robustness tests. 67 The results are also robust to adding country-fixed effects (see Appendix, Table A7 , Model 2). 68 The variable is measured as the natural log of the total number of troops divided by population (denoted in 1,000,000), using data from Kathman 2013 and UN 2014 (the National Accounts Main Aggregates Database). Using a simple count of the number of troops does not significantly alter our main findings.
69 P5 Troops in PKO is a dummy capturing the presence of peacekeeping troops in the country from at least one of the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council.
peacekeeping operation in the country. The coefficient for P5 participation in the mission is negative and statistically significant, suggesting an additional local effect of high-profile missions. We do not find any significant effect of the duration of the PKO on civilian protection and thus no indication that missions improve over time in their ability to reduce violence against civilians. 70 Importantly, the introduction of these variables does not influence our main result. Hence, the local effect of peacekeeping we discern is not merely a reflection of a sizeable or sustained peacekeeping force at the country level.
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Conclusions
The protection of civilians is a major challenge for many peacekeeping operations. While 71 We have also controlled for GCPpc (the cell-equivalent to GDP per capita), whether an ethno-political group that is excluded from political power resides in the cell, the presence of natural resources, and the military capacity of the warring actors (results and discussions are provided in Appendix Table A8 ). The
Appendix also reports additional robustness pertaining to the estimation of rare events (Table A9) ; dropping events with less precise geographical precision (Table A10) ; alternative thresholds in our dependent variable (Table A11) ; and local PKO interest (Table A12 ). level. In sum, while strong local presence enhances the effectiveness of civilian protection, UN peacekeeping struggles to credibly protect civilians from government forces and to respond to violence against civilians in a timely manner.
Patterns of local peacekeeping deployment is a variable that is subject to policy intervention. Hence, evidence pointing so strongly in the direction of peacekeeping efficacy should be useful information for those that craft policies in these areas, and those that advise them. Given the constraints on the supply side of peacekeepers, our findings are also important since they provide novel insights on how peacekeeping works. If the UN wants to protect civilians, it has to be ready to prioritize areas where the risk of violence is the highest. Even if the UN on average is more likely to deploy to areas where civilians are at risk, there are many areas that are left completely unattended. In these areas, violence is allowed to continue without the interference of blue helmets. This means that the greatest challenge for UN peacekeeping is not primarily a military challenge of finding effective ways of dealing with violence, but rather a political challenge of gathering the willpower to take necessary action. 
